Verifying a Signed Onion Address With PGP

A signature is only worth checking if you know whose key made it. This guide runs the check in Kleopatra and in GnuPG, shows how to read each result and explains why the fingerprint, not the signature, is what protects you.

What a valid signature proves, and what it does not

A valid PGP signature on a mirror message tells you one thing: the text was signed by whoever holds a particular private key, and no character has changed since. It says nothing about the market. Everything useful you can do with it depends on whether that key really belongs to the operator.

Sealed letter with a purple wax seal beside a brass pen, a metaphor for a signed message
A signature proves who sealed the message, not that the sender is trustworthy. Illustration.

That is why the check beats looking at an address. A cloned onion address can match the real one in its first eight characters, and a clone login page can copy the layout pixel for pixel. A clone cannot produce a valid signature from the operator's key, because it does not hold the private half.

Getting the right key

The key is the part that can be faked. Anyone can publish a public key and a message signed with it, so a signature that verifies against a key you took from the same page as the message proves nothing. What you compare is the fingerprint, 40 hexadecimal characters usually printed in groups of four.

Two almost identical brass keys held side by side so that their teeth can be compared under a beam of light
The fingerprint is what you compare, character by character. Illustration.

Collect the operator's key from two sources that do not depend on each other. One could be a market address you already trust and the other an older signed post you saved. Import it, read the fingerprint it reports and check that it is identical in both places, character by character. If the two disagree, stop: one of them is a clone and you cannot tell which. Do this once per market and keep the fingerprint. From then on you compare only against the one you stored.

Choosing a tool

ToolWhere it comes fromBest for
KleopatraGpg4win on Windows, GPG Suite on macOS, the package manager on LinuxThe first time, because it shows the fingerprint in a dialog
GnuPG on the command lineInstalled with the packages above; documented in the GNU Privacy HandbookRepeat checks, once you have done it twice

Take each from its own project site, by the same rule as Tor Browser in the Tor Browser guide. A repackaged installer is a worse risk than any clone login page. Pick one tool and stay with it, since most mistakes come from half-learning both.

The check in Kleopatra

  1. Save the public key block as a .asc file and import it with File, Import. Menu names shift slightly between versions.
  2. Open the imported certificate's details and compare the fingerprint with the one you recorded from two sources.
  3. Open the Notepad tab and paste the whole signed message, from -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- to -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----, headers included. A message cut short will fail.
  4. Run Decrypt/Verify. Kleopatra reports a valid signature from the certificate you imported, or a failure.
  5. Copy the onion address out of the message you just verified, not from a page that merely quotes it.

The check with GnuPG

Import the key, print its fingerprint and compare it with your stored one. Then save the signed message to a text file and verify it.

gpg --import operator-key.asc
gpg --fingerprint
gpg --verify mirrors.txt

The line you want says Good signature from, followed by the operator's key name. GnuPG usually adds a warning that the key is not certified with a trusted signature. That is normal for a key you have not signed yourself and does not mean the check failed. What decides it is the fingerprint you compared beforehand.

Reading the result

What you seeWhat it meansWhat to do
BAD signatureThe text differs from what was signedRe-copy the message first, since a dropped line or a changed space causes this. If a clean copy still fails, discard its addresses.
No public keyYou have not imported the operator's key, or you imported a different oneDo not look for a key on the page that supplied the message.
Good signature, wrong name or fingerprintThe signature is valid, for a key the clone's owner madeStop. A valid signature only counts when the fingerprint matches the one you checked.
Good signature, matching fingerprintThe text came from the holder of the key you verifiedRead the addresses from the verified text and check its date.

Old signatures stay valid

A signed message can be old. Operators sign a list of addresses on a given day, and a signature from last year still verifies today even if one address on it has since been retired or lost to a takeover. Read the date inside the signed text and prefer the operator's newest message.

How often to repeat it

You do not need the full routine at every visit. Run it when you first add a market, when the operator announces a new address, and whenever a link reaches you from anywhere other than your own saved list. For daily logins a bookmark you verified once is enough, combined with whatever the market shows on its login screen. TorZon displays a personal anti-phishing phrase. Some markets also publish a signed warrant canary, which is worth reading and is not a guarantee: Dark Matter published one and exit-scammed in late September 2026.

Verification answers whether you reached the operator. It does not answer whether the operator deserves your money. For that, read the escrow guide and our account of the 2025 shutdowns. Our verification method describes how addresses on this site are matched against these signed messages.